



FRANCE22
FRENCH PRESIDENCY
OF THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION

SUNYMEU 2022 AGENDA

Proposed by Member States, submitted by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, and finalised by the French Presidency, European Council President, European Commission President, and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

March 18, 2022

Table of Contents

EUROPEAN COUNCIL	3
1) Acceleration of the membership application of Ukraine towards accession as an EU member and increase pressure on Russia	3
Background	3
Recommendations	5
2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (Capabilities and Crisis Management sections)	6
Links to:	6
Background	6
Recommendations	7
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL	10
1) Common European Asylum System/Border Control	10
Links to:	10
Background	10
Recommendations	15
2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (Partnerships section)	20
Links to:	20
Background	20
Recommendations	21
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE	22
1) European Green Deal and Energy Independence	22
Links to:	22
Background	22
Recommendations	24
2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (Resilience section)	27
Links to:	27
Background	27
Recommendations	28
COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES (COREPER II)	29
Working toward European Union's Social Model: Implementing the European Health Union and a Four-Day Workweek	29
Links to:	29
Background	29
1) Recommendations pertaining to the European Health Union:	31
2) Recommendations pertaining to the Four-Day Workweek	34

EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1) Acceleration of the membership application of Ukraine towards accession as an EU member and increase pressure on Russia

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World*

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part III – Developing our Economic Base – Strengthening the single market and developing an assertive, comprehensive and coordinated industrial policy to foster growth and innovation (p. 8), Increasing EU autonomy and competitiveness in the space sector (p. 12), Supporting research, education and out youth (p. 13), Part V - Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World - A more sovereign Europe (p. 26)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Defence (p. 23), Research and Innovation (pp. 49-50), Space (p. 51)

<https://www.lrp.lt/en/media-center/news/open-letter-by-presidents-in-support-of-ukraines-swift-candidacy-to-the-european-union/37859>

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World*

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World – The EU’s Neighbourhood (p. 22-23, 26)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Foreign Affairs – Eastern Neighbourhood (p.19)

Background

On February 24, 2022, at 05:55 am Moscow time, Vladimir Putin denounced Ukraine’s sovereignty and right to independence and choice of security by approving the use of the Russian armed forces to invade Ukraine. Its objective is to overthrow the democratic government, install a pro-Russian regime, and destabilise the region. This attack is the most

significant threat to European security and stability since 1945. Lithuania shares a border with Russia and, given our size, is a very vulnerable target to Russian aggression.

The Republic of Poland and its Government propose an acceleration of the membership application of Ukraine towards the goal of accession, to ease tensions and provide expanding support in the region while assisting in reforms and criteria required by standards consistent with European Union requirements (Copenhagen criteria).

Eight years ago, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was removed by the Ukrainian parliament and fled to Russia. His departure came after more than one hundred demonstrators were killed when he gave the order to evacuate by force demonstrators in Independence Square in Kyiv. These demonstrators had been gathering for three months following the Ukrainian government's decision not to sign an association agreement with the European Union and to favour a rapprochement with Russia. They considered themselves European and a sovereign nation-state. Since this 'revolution of dignity,' and despite the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas, Ukrainians have not turned away from their European aspirations. According to a poll by the Ukrainian Institute Rating Group published on February 17, 2022, 68% of respondents support membership in the European Union. In 2015, the European Union recognised 'Ukraine's European aspirations' and welcomed 'its European choice.' In 2017, the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, passed a law making EU membership one of the strategic goals of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. This law, which came into force in 2019, enshrines this goal in the country's constitution and thus marks, according to the speaker of the parliament at the time, 'the irreversibility of our European choice.'

Ukraine cooperates with the European Union within the framework of the Eastern Partnership and has already adopted most of its legislation and economic policies in accordance with the association agreement signed with the European Union and entered into force in 2017. Discussions have begun on the topic of membership within the European Commission and The Republic of Poland calls upon its fellow member states to continue proceedings with the goal of accession for Ukraine.

One only has to walk through the streets of Warsaw, Bratislava, Tallinn, Bucharest, or Vilnius to see the beneficial effects that EU membership has had on these cities. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe contribute fully and greatly to making the European Union an economic, political and technological power. The youth of Kyiv, a city full of life, innovation, and creation, aspires to the same success and opportunities. Since 2014, Ukraine has paid dearly for its thirst for freedom and belief in the European ideals and democratic world. Despite the attacks, threats, and ongoing war Ukrainians want to join Europe. The time has come to strengthen our support for Ukraine.

<https://visegradinsight.eu/letter-for-the-official-recognition-of-ukraine-as-a-candidate-state-for-eu-membership/>

Recommendations

1. The European Commission should act expeditiously to prepare for opening of accession talks with Ukraine with the aim of fast tracking Ukraine's accession to the European Union.
2. The European Union should immediately recognize full rights and privileges of Ukraine as a sovereign nation-state as any other member of the European Union.
3. EU should continue to send weapons, resources, funds, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as deploy more troops within member states of Eastern Europe
4. Russian banks should be removed from SWIFT. The EU commission shall encourage the G20 to put heavier sanctions on Russia, to be targeted to Putin and his closest colleagues.
5. The EU should commit to fighting Russian dirty money within its jurisdiction and put pressure on countries lacking in sanction compliance or giving shelter to financial assets by sanctioned Russian individuals.

2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (*Capabilities and Crisis Management sections*)

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World*

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part III – Developing our Economic Base – Strengthening the single market and developing an assertive, comprehensive and coordinated industrial policy to foster growth and innovation (p. 8), Increasing EU autonomy and competitiveness in the space sector (p. 12), Supporting research, education and out youth (p. 13), Part V - Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World - A more sovereign Europe (p. 26)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Defence (p. 23), Research and Innovation (pp. 49-50), Space (p. 51)

Background

In the past 20 years, the EU has successfully managed more than 30 civilian and military operations to fulfil Petersberg Tasks as defined in Article 43(1) of the TEU, specifically (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. In this time period, the EU has established a joint decision-making apparatus and command and control capabilities. In 2017 Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel expressed a sentiment that is increasingly repeated in Europe: ‘We Europeans should take our fate into our own hands’. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/VP of the European Commission (HR/VP) echoed this sentiment when he declared the EU ‘has to learn the language of power’. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the need for the EU to build a strong European Defence Union (EDU) from its current joint civilian and military peace-keeping, policing, and judicial operations to a full-fledged security and defence capability. Recognizing this need for independent action and expressing a desire for

the EU to become a strategic global actor, in 2020 the European Council directed the HR/VP to develop a 'Strategic Compass' for security and defence that would guide the EU through 2030. The Strategic Compass has now completed its two-year consultation and reflection period, which culminated in the presentation of a proposal to the 23-24 March 2022 meeting of the European Council. Events, however, have not stood still for the EU's Member States to act expeditiously to ensure European citizens can live in security and peace. The following recommendations draw on the four baskets proposed in the Strategic Compass: Capabilities, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Partnerships.

Recommendations

Capabilities

- All Member States increase their defence spending by a minimum of 2.5 percent of national GNI by 2024. An annual report monitoring defence spending will be submitted to The European Commission's Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS).
- DG DEFIS staff should be increased immediately through seconding of national defence experts from throughout the EU Member State's civil service, with the goal of permanently increasing DG DEFIS staff by 10 per cent by 2024.
- The European Defence Fund (EDF) of 7,9 billion EURO for MFF 2021-27 to be increased by 5 billion EURO to be raised through Euro Defence Bonds, collateralized by the EU's budget and issued by the European Central Bank. The success of the Next Generation EU funding mechanism approved as part of the MFF 2021-27 package demonstrates the viability of Eurobonds.
- CFSP and CSDP matters will no longer require unanimity in the Council. Decisions will be adopted via qualified majority voting (QMV). To accomplish this Article 42 II TEU will be revised to include the provisions of Article 16 III TEU.
- The EU will increase its presence in space, specifically to conduct military operations, monitor arms trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity and observe environmental and climatic changes. These would include countermeasures and system hardening against electronic warfare and ASAT (anti-satellite weapons) threats to the Galileo and Copernicus constellation.
- Invest in naval capabilities to ensure free and open access to maritime routes, protect overseas territories and EU citizens in maritime areas.
- The EU will increase its presence in space, specifically to conduct military operations, monitor arms trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity and observe environmental

and climactic changes.

- Continue the efforts of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to de-fragmentize the European defence industry.
 - PESCO should continue to focus on 'cluster' packages particularly a European Next Generation Fighter, combat and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) drones, hypersonic propulsion technologies, Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (SAMS), next-generation Main Battle Tanks, automated ground combat systems, the development of a carrier strike group and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Systems should be integrated via a C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and ISR architecture).
 - More effort should be made to increase defence R&D and production capability throughout EU member states keeping in mind solidarity goals of PESCO and CSDP.
- Annual progress report submitted to DG DEFIS on joint defence capabilities tied to the NATO Defence Planning Process.
- Recognizing that to build a state-of-the-art defence industry, EU citizens will need to have the highest quality education in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). An EU-wide lottery will be launched, proceeds of which will support university and technical college education in STEM fields for EU citizens and permanent residents, which will be allocated for scholarships and maintenance for students on a competitive basis.
- The EU should work towards improving its Common Security and Defense Policy to create a modern, advanced EU army to deter further Russian aggression.

Crisis Management

- Merge the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) (command and control – C₂) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) into a new 'European Special Forces Command' structure by January 1, 2024.
- The Military Committee (EUMC) comprised of the Member State Chiefs of Defence should be elevated to that of C₂ reporting directly to a newly created position of EU Chair of the EUMC. The EUMC Chair will convene meetings and coordinate the EUMC. The EUMC will serve as an advisory body to the newly created European Special Forces Command.
- Establish a permanent EU Intervention Force (EIF) of 5,000 troops by January 1, 2024, and 10,000 troops by January 1, 2025. The EIF will be able to respond to the full range of military crisis-management tasks, for example a rescue and evacuation mission or a stabilisation operation in a hostile environment.

- Prioritise crisis management in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.
- The EU should lay out the specific circumstances under which Articles 42 7 TEU ('mutual assistance clause') should be invoked.
- EU stockpile of emergency supplies such as PPEs, medicines, vaccines, fuel supplies, and so forth that would be shared based on an additional point, to be introduced as Article 42 8 TEU.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL

1) Common European Asylum System/Border Control

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Protecting Citizens and Freedom, Promoting Europe’s Interests and Value in the World*

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part II – Protecting Citizens and Freedoms (pp. 4-5), Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World (p. 19, 22-23)

-*Programme of the French Presidency, Continuing Work on Asylum and Migration* (p. 33), Foreign Affairs (pp. 16, 20-21)

Background

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was negotiated and established in response to the EU’s experience of the refugee crisis brought about by war in Yugoslavia and the Serbian-Kosovo conflict. Since the CEAS’s adoption, the EU has struggled to balance the EU’s humanitarian values expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the imperative of border management in the Schengen Area to ensure that Europeans are secure and safe. Some Member States, particularly the Southern Seven, and governmental and non-governmental organisations have long expressed their dissatisfaction with gaps in the CEAS with respect to qualification determinations, reception conditions, services provided to refugees, the Dublin Regulation rules for determining where an asylum application should be filed, and so forth. Then in 2015-16 the CEAS came under enormous pressure when more than one million Syrians sought asylum in the EU as they fled the civil war precipitated by the Arab Spring movement. The current crisis involves more than 2.5 million (as of March 12) Ukrainians fleeing violence inflicted by the Russian military.

The following concerns must guide the EU’s CEAS:

- *Providing safe haven for Ukrainians fleeing the violence of the Russian invasion through the mechanism of the Temporary Protective Directive (TPD) of 2001.*

The Temporary Protection Directive of 2001/44/European Council was enacted after the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia, but the EU activated it for the first time when the Justice and Home Affairs Council voted unanimously to invoke TPD on 4 March 2022. Article 2 (a) of the TPD defines temporary protection as:

a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection.

Under this directive, temporary protection is available to Ukrainians displaced from Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. As a result of this conflict, more than 2.5 million Ukrainians (as of 10 March 2022) have fled, with over 1.5 million entering Poland alone. The TPD directive, unlike the Dublin Regulation, allows Ukrainian nationals to travel visa-free in Europe for a 90-day period, after which time they can select the EU Member State that they would like to stay in and apply for temporary protection. The TPD, however, has never been tested. 'Cracks' in the TPD system are emerging, where many of its aspects are voluntary rather than required by EU law. Furthermore, many Europeans as well as the global community question why the TPD was not invoked other occasions. In 2011 the JHA Council denied requests by the Italian and Maltese governments to activate TPD for Tunisians and Libyans fleeing due to Arab Spring in Tunisia and the fall of the Qaddafi regime on the basis that the conditions for activation were not met (despite over 55,000 Tunisians and Libyans having arrived to Lampedusa by sea). Again, in 2015 when one million Syrian refugees who had fled the civil war sought refuge in Europe, the JHA Council did not activate the TPD.

The uncertainty in Member States surrounding their obligations under the TPD points to a need for a more common and structured TP framework for migrants to safely evacuate and apply for asylum in EU Member States, while at the same time deterring terrorists, smugglers, and human traffickers from taking advantage of the chaotic situation at the EU's borders with non-Schengen countries. Do only Ukrainian citizens qualify for TP? For example, the Nigerian government has condemned the treatment of thousands of Nigerian students and citizens studying and living in Ukraine who are being denied TP simply because they are not Ukrainian citizens. People of color are being met with acts of discrimination and violence when attempting to flee into other EU Member States, with multiple reported incidents, including video footage.

- *Dealing humanely with irregular migration in the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean.*

The EU continues to 'offshore' irregular migration from Africa with Libya its principal partner in stemming irregular migration along the Central Mediterranean route. The EU and some Member States (particularly Italy) have spent millions of euros through the Emergency Trust fund for Africa (EUTF Africa) North of Africa window: to subsidize and train the Libyan Coast Guard on search and rescue (S & R) operations to prevent irregular migrants from successfully reaching EU territory through the Central Mediterranean (including patrol speedboats, rafts, trucks, satellite telephones, uniforms), interdiction and return, and humanitarian assistance (for example, hygiene kits, blankets, clothing, medical care). Investigative reporting has revealed that Frontex operates reconnaissance planes that transmit aerial surveillance footage to the Libyan Coast Guard, which then overtakes the migrants' crafts and forcibly inters asylum seekers in Libyan detention centres and camps. Asylum seekers from African countries interred in Libyan milita-run detention centres are suffering human rights abuses including bribery, beatings and torture, sexual and gender-based violence, murder and being sold into slavery. It is widely understood that the EU pays for all aspects of the offshoring of migration interception and 'containment' in Libya, including the SUVs used to hunt down migrants who have escaped detention centres, even if the EU does not pay for the actual detention centres or its guards. The migration pressure from African countries will continue to grow more urgent as population growth in African outstrips that of other global regions. The EU needs to seek out both regional and global solutions to refugee crises and irregular migration.

- *Due to the Dublin Regulation that requires under most circumstances for asylum seekers to remain in and apply for asylum in those Member State where they arrived on EU territory, certain EU Member States, particularly the Southern Seven (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain) have been unduly burdened by the Dublin requirement.*

Suffering in overcrowded closed migration campus in Greece continues, with asylum seekers who crossed to Greek islands from the Aegean (Eastern Mediterranean route)

being forced to remain while it can take years for Greek authorities to make an asylum determination. The Juncker Commission's European Agenda on Migration failed to achieve agreement in Council, particularly the 'fairness mechanism' that would be triggered if the number of asylum applications reached over 150 per cent of a pre-determined reference number, with asylum seekers over that threshold relocated across the EU. The Commission's 'New Pact on Migration and Asylum' (2020) offers 'flexible solidarity'.

- *Reducing incentives for third countries to weaponise migration (as particularly illustrated on the borders of Belarus/Lithuanian; Morocco/Spain's autonomous city of Ceuta; and Greece/Turkey)*

The unpopularity of irregular migration among Europeans has been manipulated by anti-democratic populist parties throughout the EU. This vulnerability has been exploited by some third country governments seeking to weaponize migration against the EU. *The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and Turkey Facilitation Agreement*, in effect since March 2016, has been effective in stemming the flow of irregular migration to Greece; however, this agreement has created a situation where other third countries now expect the EU to provide substantial support for their governments to reduce irregular migration to Europe.

- *Returning migrants to their home countries who do not qualify for asylum.*

Reducing the presence of irregular migrants in the EU has been stymied by home countries that do not want to accept the return of their citizens, not least because of the dependence on families and the government's current account balance for remittances. Progress must be made in this area.

- *Assisting migrant-sending countries to reduce incentives for citizens leaving their countries for the EU.*

The EU needs to do a better job of persuading migrants to follow established legal channels to apply to emigrate to EU Member States and working with host countries to provide opportunities that will reduce incentives for outward migration.

- *Implementing policies to ensure that refugees who are granted asylum in an EU member state are afforded opportunities to thrive in all aspects of life – education, social mobility, housing, jobs training through inclusionary policies while recognizing that asylees must accept the European way of life, including its democratic values and seek to integrate themselves and their families into the Member States that have granted them asylum.*

The EU and its Member States must continuously work to ensure migrants and their families are afforded the opportunity to enjoy all of the benefits of European society and dynamic economy, but migrants must also accept that the benefits of European citizenship carrying obligations and responsibility to accept the European way of life.

- *Reforming the UN system to tackle migration at the global level.*

Migration is a global concern. The International Migration Organisation (IOM) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) were founded after World War 2 with disparate missions; however, their missions increasingly overlap in the context of contemporary migration issues. The UNHCR, operating under the auspices of the General Assembly, protects refugees worldwide and facilitates their return home or resettlement. The IOM's mission as an organization related to the UN is to ensure the 'orderly and human management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced people'. Neither is a specialized UN agency and depend on voluntary contributions. It is increasingly recognized that the distinction between refugee and migrant can no longer be clearly delineated – the 'hungry idealist' – can be both a refugee/asylum seeker, but also select a particular country or region for migration because of the superior economic opportunities afforded to the migrant and their families. This overlapping mission has led to wasteful duplication, confusion, and even rivalry between the IOM and UNHCR.

- *Tying ODA Funding to Third Country Cooperation in Stemming Migrations Flows.*

European countries and EU institutions, collectively are the most generous givers of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The European Commission and the European

Investment Bank (EIB) manage the EU's ODA donation and the EEAS coordinates foreign policy. The EU institutions (without EU member states) rank third among donors. European institutions also mobilize private investments to supplement ODA. The *Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe* contains the bulk of EU institutions' ODA contributions with an envelope of EUR 79.5 billion for 2021-27. It has been increasingly recognized that one of the mechanisms for decreasing irregular migration from the EU's troubled neighbourhood is through reallocation of ODA to those recipient countries whose governments comply with the EU's request that their border control authorities prevent irregular migration across land and sea borders into the EU. The EU and its Member States are the largest contributors of ODA to the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to non-cooperation of many governments in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa with respect to controlling outward irregular migration, ODA should be considered a tool for the EU to use in persuading third country governments to cooperate.

Recommendations

1. Temporary Protection.

- a. The EU is expending considerable sums to support provide for Ukrainian refugees. The Commission should monitor closely the 85 million euro humanitarian funding package, the additional 240 million euro pledged, and the additional 100 million euro in supplies delivered through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
- b. The Temporary Protection Directive should be amended:
 - i. to include TP for stateless persons, asylum seekers, and other Third-Country Nationals residing legally in the country receiving TP.
 - ii. TP should be automatically granted for 3 years if the refugee has not applied for asylum
 - iii. to specify that TP will automatically come into force if 500,000 or more refugees are displaced by a *force majeure* from any of the following regions: Europe, the Middle East, North Africa & Subsaharan Africa.

c. Evaluation as to whether the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of crisis and *force majeure* in the field of migration and asylum should be withdrawn in favour of amending the TPD.

2. Operations in the Central Mediterranean.

a. Working with the European Asylum Agency (EAA) and European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to provide technical assistance including: asylum officers to assist with asylum and refugee processing & assistance with returns of said asylum seekers as well.

b. Frontex to report on all Eurosur activities in which it is providing information to the Libyan Coast Guard about suspected irregular migrants attempting to reach EU Member States.

c. Increasing funding for provisions for modern technological updates to the National Coordination Centres (NCCs) and Eurosur with regards to stem illegal border crossing

d. The EU should revive Operation Sophia, with its main mandate a Search and Rescue Operations under CSDP. Operation Sophia should operate throughout the Mediterranean, rather than be confined to Eastern Libya (the mandate of Operation Irini).

e. Continued financial support to Libya to reduce migratory flows in the Western Mediterranean contingent upon:

1. inspections conducted by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) of migration detention facilities.

2. Frontex officers accompanying Libyan Coast Guard on interdiction to ensure compliance with Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

3. Continue work to agree to reforms to Dubin III, specifically:

a. Adding to the hierarchy of Dublin member state responsibility individuals who earned a diploma from that member state and the presence of siblings.

b. Member States pledge to contribute their fair share, calculated based on GDP and population.

i. Member states can opt to accept relocated migrants or to sponsor returns.

ii. If the pledges received fall more than 30% of what is needed for relocations or sponsored returns, then member states that did not pledge should cover at least half of their 'fair share' that had been calculated for relocations or return sponsorship.

c. The ending immediately of closed migration campus, such as on the Island of Samos.

d. The immediate relocation of 30% of asylum seekers from detention centres in Greece

and Italy to detention centres in other EU Member States.

4. The Justice and Affairs Council should act expeditiously to agree the New Pact on Migration

and Asylum.

a. Screening Regulation

b. Amended asylum procedures

c. Dublin reforms (see above)

d. Eurodac Regulation amended

5. Improving Conditions in Third Countries

a. Allocating a percentage of funding (estimated €50 million) to aid in post-pandemic crisis recovery to incentivize refugee returns and reduce incentives for outward migration.

i. These funds will be mainly to aid in the recovery of infrastructure and provide a competitive job market for irregular migrants who voluntarily return to their home countries

ii. clean and renewable energy production

iii. infrastructure improvements

iv. financing for K-12 public education

v. EU Member States commit to OECD targets for ODA for those third countries cooperating with returns of their citizens who are irregular migrants and do not qualify for asylum.

6. Increasing funding from the current €9 billion to €11 billion in the 2021-27 MFF for the

The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AIMF), with special attention for these needs:

a. Building and staffing of shelter, increasing aid (food, clothing, etc.) and security measures (particularly of minors to avoid sex-trafficking) to migration detention facilities.

b. Processing of asylum seekers.

i. Ensuring migration detention facilities are brought up to equal standards throughout EU Member States.

ii. Increasing the number of Frontex standing corps from 600 to 2000 members by 2025 to be deployed to hotspots facing pressure from a large influx of asylum seekers.

c. Providing sustainable healthcare, along with medical pre-screening.

d. Job and language training and schooling.

e. Increasing the multiannual financial basis of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Programme to combat discrimination against migrants, refugees, and asylees.

7. Declare the EU's support for a new specialised UN agency for migration. The EEAS is directed to work with the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations to begin steps to organise a high-level conference to discuss establishing a specialised UN agency on global migration.

8. Tie ODA funding to countries located in the MENA and sub-Saharan African regions to cooperate with respect to stemming the outward irregular migration of their citizens. The EEAS and the Commission are directed to formulate a plan for decreasing direct EU ODA funds based on annual irregular migration numbers. Third countries that reduce their irregular migration outflows and increase the acceptance of returns will receive their usual ODA allotments plus a bonus for progress in reducing net irregular migration to the EU.

2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (*Partnerships section*)

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World*

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part III – Developing our Economic Base – Strengthening the single market and developing an assertive, comprehensive and coordinated industrial policy to foster growth and innovation (p. 8), Increasing EU autonomy and competitiveness in the space sector (p. 12), Supporting research, education and out youth (p. 13), Part V - Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World - A more sovereign Europe (p. 26)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Defence (p. 23), Research and Innovation (pp. 49-50), Space (p. 51)

Background

In the past 20 years, the EU has successfully managed more than 30 civilian and military operations to fulfil Petersberg Tasks as defined in Article 43(1) of the TEU, specifically (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. In this time period, the EU has established a joint decision-making apparatus and command and control capabilities. In 2017 Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel expressed a sentiment that is increasingly repeated in Europe: ‘We Europeans should take our fate into our own hands’. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/VP of the European Commission (HR/VP) echoed this sentiment when he declared the EU ‘has to learn the language of power’. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the need for the EU to build a strong European Defence Union (EDU) from its current joint civilian and military peace-keeping, policing, and judicial operations to a full-fledged security and defence capability. Recognizing this need for independent action and expressing a desire for

the EU to become a strategic global actor, in 2020 the European Council directed the HR/VP to develop a 'Strategic Compass' for security and defence that would guide the EU through 2030. The Strategic Compass has now completed its two-year consultation and reflection period, which culminated in the presentation of a proposal to the 23-24 March 2022 meeting of the European Council. Events, however, have not stood still for the EU's Member States to act expeditiously to ensure European citizens can live in security and peace. The following recommendations draw on the four baskets proposed in the Strategic Compass: Capabilities, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Partnerships.

Recommendations

Partnerships

- Work more closely with the UN to identify and manage joint peacekeeping operations.
- Support efforts to begin a dialogue to establish a specialized UN agency for migration management to replace the voluntary funded, overburdened UNHCR and IOM.
- Strengthen partnership with the African Union (AU).
- Build on successful trade agreements with Japan and South Korea to explore strategic partnerships in the areas of defence and hybrid threats.
- Integrate more fully discussions of the Strategic Compass with NATO's Strategic Concept, laying out areas and protocol for independent EU action and use of NATO resources and support for such actions.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

1) European Green Deal and Energy Independence

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Building a Climate – Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe*

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part IV – Building a Climate-Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe (pp. 15-19)

-*Programme of the French Presidency, Building a Responsible Sustainable Capitalism* (p. 28), Energy (p. 55), Transport (p. 56), Environment (pp. 64-70)

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Building a Climate – Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe*

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part IV – Building a Climate-Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe (pp. 15-19)

-*Programme of the French Presidency, Agriculture and Fisheries* (pp. 60-61)

Background

Food insecurity refers to the inability to access nutritious food due to financial constraints. In fact, combatting food hunger is a primary goal of the UN Sustainable Development Agenda (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs).

The economic hit that the EU faced during the pandemic reveals a well-needed reform of agri-food systems to guarantee affordable food to all citizens. This means making such systems more economically efficient and environmentally sustainable.

The Farm to Fork Strategy promotes the goal of making food systems healthier, more sustainable, more efficient, and better for the workers involved.

The European Union is the global leader in the fight against climate change. Climate change policy is of vital importance to the well-being and survival of Europe as well as the rest of the world. Southern and central areas of Europe have been witnessing strong and frequent heat waves that have resulted in droughts, forest fires, and crop failures. Southern Europe has also been experiencing record low rainfall that makes it more susceptible to drought and wildfires, while Northern Europe has been experiencing unusually high rainfall resulting in more frequent floods.

Natural gas is one of the primary sources of energy in European households, and 40% of natural gas imported by the EU comes from Russia. As the Russia-Ukraine crisis continues, Russia is threatening to halt the delivery of natural gas through its pipelines, and whether they follow through with this or not, one thing is certain, and that is energy prices are going to soar. The economic consequences of the geopolitical crisis between Russia and Ukraine, is another reason the EU needs to consider Europe's energy independence while deciding its Green Deal policies.

In 2019 Ursula von der Leyen appointed Frans Timmerman as executive vice president of the Commission, to focus on the Green Deal, with the goal of making Europe the world's first climate-neutral continent. Timmerman's portfolio includes climate, environment, energy, and transport, underlining the Commission's commitment to tackling environmental policy, while considering its interconnectedness with other policies that impact the environment.

Environmental policies cannot be decided without considering energy policy at the same time and need to be enacted in a way that facilitate maximum flexibility when transposing into national law. Environmental policy will continue to be tied closely to climate change and to energy efficiency and security.

The use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity is considered safe. In the last six decades there have only been three significant accidents in the history of civil nuclear power: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi. Every year several hundred people die in coal mines, and there is wide public acceptance that the risks associated with these industries are an acceptable tradeoff for the services they provide. However, with nuclear energy, the very few accidents have been spectacular and newsworthy. Although nuclear energy can generate electricity safely and would greatly assist the EU in reaching their goal of being carbon neutral by 2050, it still faces opposition among its member states.

The Austrian Minister for Climate Protection, Ecology, Energy, Transport, Innovation, and Technology Leonore Gevessler has stated Vienna is seriously concerned that nuclear power is too expensive and too slow to help in the fight against climate change. The Minister also

pointed out the problem of nuclear waste and the fact that it has not yet been solved, as reasons for nuclear energy not being a safe source of energy. German Environment Minister Steffi Lemke, supported by her Austrian counterpart Leonora Gevessler, also believe nuclear energy cannot be considered safe and can lead to terrible man-made disasters and poisoning the planet for many decades to come.

[The Energy Tax Directive](#) (ETD) (2003/96/EC) establishes minimum taxes for motor and heating fuels and electricity. On 14 July 2021, after extensive public consultation, the feedback period ended on 18 November 2021. The Commission then submitted to the European Parliament (Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee) and the Council (Working Party on tax questions) a revised ETD that aligns these taxes with Green Deal climate targets by ensuring that the taxation rates reflect their impact on the environment and our health. The European Economic and Social Committee adopted an opinion on the ETD on 21 January 2022. The new rules aim at addressing the harmful effects of energy tax competition, helping secure revenues for Member States from green taxes less determinantal to growth than taxes on labour. They will remove outdated exemptions and incentive for the use of fossil fuels, while promoting clean technologies. The revised ETD will also help foster investment in new and innovative green industry and help facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels toward clean fuels and support the EU's delivery of its ambitious targets on the reduction of GHG emissions and energy savings. [See EP GD legislative train schedule](#). [See legislative train schedule for the ETD](#).

Recommendations

1. The European Parliament and the Council are directed to move expeditiously in considering the [Fit for 55 Package](#), which was presented by the European Commission on 14 July 2021. This package of legislative proposals aims to align the EU's climate and energy policy framework with its new economy-wide target for 2030 of reducing net GHG emissions by at least 55% and put it on track to reach its objectives of becoming climate neutral by 2050.
2. The Fit for 55 Package includes a proposal for a Social Climate Fund (SCF), which will be funded from a part of the ETS auction revenue to support vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users, notably for investments to reduce emissions and energy costs as well as for temporary direct income support. The Commission is directed to create a permanent Social Justice Climate Forum (using as its basis the Ad hoc Working Party on Social Climate Fund) comprised of stakeholders from throughout the EU to set out the parameters to qualify for funding under the SCF. At least 25% of ETS auction funds will be allocated to the SCF.

3. The Fit for 55 Package includes the ETS Innovation Fund funded by ETS auctions. The Commission is directed to create an ETS Innovation Fund Forum, which will be comprised of experts and stakeholders from throughout the EU to set out the parameters to qualify for funding under the ETS Innovation Fund.
4. The Commission should move forward in plans for Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) own resources to the EU's budget. The CBAM should be applied to any product imported from a country outside of the EU that does not have a system to price carbon such as the EU ETS. This is a fairness mechanism for EU companies that pay a higher price for green production. The CBAM resource will be shared so that 25% of the revenue will be kept by the EU country levying the CBAM at the port of entry to cover administrative costs. The remaining 75% will go to the EU budget.
5. The Commission is directed to establish a 'Wise Person's Task Force' that will be charged with an all-inclusive study of total energy needed for the EU to become carbon neutral, and how the EU can work with the rest of the world to achieve this. Studying the state of play for the EU in using renewable sources of energy instead of nuclear such as solar power, solar-thermal power, wind power, and hydropower, and solving nuclear waste disposal problems. The Wise Person's Task Force will inventory existing skills among EU citizens and residents and estimate the skills/college degrees needed for the EU to develop the technology to become a climate mitigation leader by 2050.
6. Reducing dependence on Russian natural gas and petroleum requires continuing to seek out other sources. More funds allocated for ports that can handle liquified natural gas, imported on maritime routes from the United States, Australia and Qatar or forming new alliances with other countries that have natural gas reserves. Recognizing that nuclear energy may be required as a bridging energy source until new green sources become more viable.
7. The Commission is asked to report its progress on Fiscal Years 2021 and 2022 spending with respect to meeting the goal of 25% of the EU's annual budget expenditure to contribute to climate action.
8. Advocating for climate change education among EU citizenry. Possible options include including it in school curriculums and awarding climate activism.
9. Reducing energy demands in the private and commercial sector by providing incentives or levying fines.
10. Continue allocating funds for reducing carbon emissions and promoting the use of renewable energy sources. Possible options include providing tax breaks to carbon efficient companies or those researching, producing, and distributing green energy

11. Providing financial assistance for participation in the FCCNP
12. Regulating all nuclear and gas plants for safety, accident and contamination prevention and waste disposal
13. Continuing to press non-EU countries to reduce their reliance on nonrenewable energy in international forums.
14. Funds from the Plastics Own Resource (in place since 1 January 2021) on non-recycled packaging waste should be earmarked for a new competitive grant program to universities and independent labs to research improving waste management technology in the EU.
15. European Union should work to closely follow the initiatives proposed by the Farm to Fork Strategy
16. European Union to continue to diversify the supply of raw materials away from Russia

2) Implementing the Strategic Compass (*Resilience section*)

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World*

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part III – Developing our Economic Base – Strengthening the single market and developing an assertive, comprehensive and coordinated industrial policy to foster growth and innovation (p. 8), Increasing EU autonomy and competitiveness in the space sector (p. 12), Supporting research, education and out youth (p. 13), Part V - Promoting Europe’s Interests and Values in the World - A more sovereign Europe (p. 26)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Defence (p. 23), Research and Innovation (pp. 49-50), Space (p. 51)

Background

In the past 20 years, the EU has successfully managed more than 30 civilian and military operations to fulfil Petersberg Tasks as defined in Article 43(1) of the TEU, specifically (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. In this time period, the EU has established a joint decision-making apparatus and command and control capabilities. In 2017 Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel expressed a sentiment that is increasingly repeated in Europe: ‘We Europeans should take our fate into our own hands’. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/VP of the European Commission (HR/VP) echoed this sentiment when he declared the EU ‘has to learn the language of power’. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the need for the EU to build a strong European Defence Union (EDU) from its current joint civilian and military peace-keeping, policing, and judicial operations to a full-fledged security and defence capability. Recognizing this need for independent action and expressing a desire for

the EU to become a strategic global actor, in 2020 the European Council directed the HR/VP to develop a 'Strategic Compass' for security and defence that would guide the EU through 2030. The Strategic Compass has now completed its two-year consultation and reflection period, which culminated in the presentation of a proposal to the 23-24 March 2022 meeting of the European Council. Events, however, have not stood still for the EU's Member States to act expeditiously to ensure European citizens can live in security and peace. The following recommendations draw on the four baskets proposed in the Strategic Compass: Capabilities, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Partnerships.

Recommendations

Resilience

- Develop the EU's intelligence efforts to counter hybrid threats (disinformation, cyber attacks, the use weaponization of irregular migration) through:
 - doubling the staff of intelligence personnel at the EEAS (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre – EU INTCEN). The EU INTCEN's intelligence gathering mandate should broaden from open source to active intelligence gathering.
 - deploying 'Rapid Reaction Cyber Threat Teams'
 - enabling more Frontex support for borders where irregular migration is being used as a weapon by hostile countries (such as Belarus)
 - developing the ability to launch counteractions against countries and groups seeking to harm the EU or its Member States
- Increase media literacy skills of Europeans to decrease their vulnerability to disinformation campaigns by China, Russia, and other countries and criminal groups seeking to destabilize European democracies.
- Develop a plan to deploy the EIF to help mitigate climate change such as shoreline erosion.

COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES (COREPER II)

Working toward European Union's Social Model: Implementing the European Health Union and a Four-Day Workweek

Links to:

-European Council, *A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024* – Building a Climate – Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe

-*Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-month Programme of the Council* (1 January 2022-30 January 2023), Part IV – Building a Climate-Neutral, Green, Fair and Social Europe (pp. 15-19)

-*Programme of the French Presidency*, Health (p. 39), Employment, Social Affairs and Equality (pp.,. 41-42)

Background

In a 1989 address to the European Parliament, European Commission President Jacques Delors observed ‘you cannot fall in love with the single market’. Although a major architect of the internal market’s completion, Delors understood the importance of the EU’s social dimension. In recent years the EU has struggled to demonstrate to ordinary working European men and women that the EU improves their everyday lives. The EU leadership has been accused of perpetuating a neoliberal vision of Europe at the expense of the European Social Model (ESM). The emphasis on the internal market at the expense of Social Europe has had the deleterious effect of treating Europeans as producers and consumers rather than citizens. Proponents of Social Europe argue that recent populist successes in mobilizing the European public underlines the importance of re-invigorating Social Europe. Two timely ways to demonstrate that the EU improves the lives of Europeans is to support a more flexible workweek and to show solidarity in the field of health care.

The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) set down fundamental social objectives: promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources, promotion of high

employment, and the combating of labour market exclusion. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights includes chapters on freedoms, equality, and solidarity, articulating rights to fair and just working conditions, social security and social assistance, equality between men and women, and trade union rights such as collective bargaining and strike action, including articulating rights to fair and just working conditions. It was announced in February this year that Belgium has adopted a four-day workweek. Employees who want to opt for the new work regime will be able to work up to 10 hours per day if trade unions agree, instead of the current 8 hours, to work one day less per week for the same pay. The benefits include helping citizens reduce transit and childcare costs. The four-day workweek will reduce the amount of fossil fuels emitted in commutes and will help achieve the EU's Green Deal. There are also many potential benefits to the health of individuals, such as better morale and improved work-life balance. In addition, reduced need for sick days will improve efficiency. As reported in the *Harvard Business Review*, many organizations in Europe are (already) cutting workweeks, though not wages, from 36 hours (five days) to 28 hours (four days) to reduce burnout and make workers happier, more productive, and more committed to their employers. There is a precedent for this policy: Iceland implemented a four-day workweek from 2015 to 2018. In studying the trial, they found that participants 'took on fewer hours and enjoyed greater well-being, improved work-life balance, and a better cooperative spirit in the workplace — all while maintaining existing standards of performance and productivity'. Japan, Scotland, and Spain all have plans to pilot a four-day workweek.

The 1986 Single European Act established a requirement for European policies to guarantee a high level of health protection. Article 168 of the TFEU states that 'the Commission complements national policies and encourage cooperation among member states'. The European Health Insurance Card has been available since 2004 and since 2011 EU citizens have had access to healthcare in other Member States. Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees health care for Europeans: 'Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities'. Nevertheless, according to the OECD Health Indicators, there are persistent health inequalities among EU's Member States. Furthermore, it has been increasingly challenging to keep up with health care spending in EU's poorer states due to financial constraints imposed by the EU after the 2006 eurozone crisis. The coronavirus pandemic further revealed the disparity among health care systems in the EU, where poorer member states had difficulty delivering vaccines and did not have enough ICU beds for patients with

coronavirus, especially in rural areas. There is a large disparity among rich and poor EU Member States in health care spending. Per capita GDP health care spending for Greece (2021) and Romania (2021) was €1603 (7.8% of GDP) and €838 (5.7% of GDP), respectively (Source: World Bank for Romania, WHO for Greece). This compares to 9.9% of GDP for the EU. Among the EU Member States, the largest shares were recorded in Germany (11.5% of GDP) and France (11.3%), followed by Sweden (10.9%). Life expectancy is 81.3 in the EU-27, but only 75.6 for Romania and 74.6 years in Bulgaria as compared to 82 years in France and 83 in Spain (2019, Eurostat). Out of pocket costs are also significantly different – from a low of 9% in France to a high of 47% in Bulgaria. Solidarity is not the only reason why Europeans should be concerned about poorer health outcomes in the countries with lower per capita health care spending. A system with fewer disparities will reduce health care shopping (wealthy citizens of the poorer Member States traveling to Northern Europe for medical and surgical procedures), ensure adequate health care for residents of other EU Member States traveling and residing in other Member States, and reduce outmigration of health care providers from the poorer to richer Member States. Furthermore, the poorer Member States are experiencing strains to their public health systems caused by asylum seekers and refugees and often these individuals do not want to even be in these EU member states, but rather are seeking to settle in Northern Europe. This has been an ongoing problem for Greece, particularly concerning Syrians fleeing from civil war and now Ukrainians fleeing to nearby EU Member States. Now is the time to improve health care systems in poorer EU Member States to better respond to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and future pandemics.

1) Recommendations pertaining to the European Health Union:

1. The European Health Union should be incorporated into Article 3 TFEU, giving the EU exclusive competence to take action on health policy.
2. The Commission will develop an enhanced health programme within Horizon Europe, with the creation of a European Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority.
3. The EU will provide support to regions and Member States experiencing difficulty attracting health workers.
4. The EU will assist in the training and education of health professionals according to common standards.

5. The EU will promote policies to safeguard the rights of health workers.
6. The EU will develop a Global Health Policy, working with the UN, especially the WHO.

7. Public Health Education

- a. Increase health literacy among European citizens.
- b. Ensure all citizens have access to reputable and reliable sources for receiving healthcare information, allowing them to take preventive measures.
- c. Increase community participation by developing educational campaigns and programs that promote healthy habits and environments.

8. Modernize Hospitals in Poorer Member States

- a. Increase staffing will help alleviate waiting times for patients in critical condition
- b. Ensure sustainable and equitable access to affordable medicines and other health
- c. Ensure modern hospitals, adequate staffing, and equipping hospitals in rural areas
- d. Provide more transport vehicles and air transport services for emergencies.
- e. Lessen greenhouse gas emissions by implementing electrical-powered ambulances. Ideally, this will modernize and make the healthcare system eco-friendly and bring innovation to the EU in accordance with the Green New Deal.

9. Improve Quality of Care in Public Health Sector

- a. Increase access to public doctors.
- b. The EU should establish measurements and benchmark national health care systems through a Health Care Scoreboard.

1. Crisis Preparedness

1. Strengthen coordination at the EU level when facing cross-border health threats
2. Advancement of European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA)

1. Improve EU health security coordination before and during crises
2. Funding for security precautions and screening.
3. Bring together the EU Member States, industry and relevant stakeholders
4. Produce vaccines, vaccine cards, vaccine centers available across member states.
5. Vaccine control centers available to the public, without overcrowding.
6. Extend the mandates of the European Center for Disease Prevention (ECDC) and Control and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to provide more robust surveillance, scientific analysis, and guidance before and during a crisis

10. Funding Mechanisms

a) Cohesion funds have been important to national health systems, with €6.6 billion allocated in cohesion funds during the 2014-20 programming period. The Next General EU funds have increased the EU budgetary commitment to improving national health care systems. This should continue.

b) The European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) visa waiver program is expected to cost €7 per applicant when it is fully operational. Non-EU nationals who do not need a visa to travel to the Schengen area will need to apply for a travel authorization through the ETIAS system prior to their trip. Part of the funding stream should of ETIAS will be earmarked for solidarity in healthcare.

c) The Commission is directed to propose a new own resource based on the reallocated profits of very large multinational companies – a share of the profits that will be allocated to the EU, based on the international agreement to tackle tax avoidance and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. The Member States will contribute to the EU budget 25% of the share of reallocated profits of very large multinationals under Pillar 1 of the OECD/G20 inclusive framework agreement. This share of the EU budget will be earmarked for Social Europe programmes.

2) Recommendations pertaining to the Four-Day Workweek

1. A transitional pilot project: to be implemented, which would include data collection and analysis, to be shared amongst the member states through a sub-committee of the European Economic and Social Committee
2. The sub-committee is to conduct consultations with trade unions across the EU to better understand operational policies and impacts of a four-day workweek.
 1. To investigate which industries and/or job types could implement the programme and which could not.
3. A transitional approach of a hybrid workplace, two days working from home and two days at the workplace.
4. Implementation of the four-day workweek, with a minimum of 28 hours worked across four days.
5. Offering an incentive program for companies and businesses that would be rewarded with tax breaks if the four-day workweek is implemented. These tax incentives will be permitted under EU competition rules.